ISO/IEC 18013-7 — mDoc online presentation
This reference covers ISO/IEC 18013-7, the standard for presenting mobile driving licences (mDLs) and generic mDocs over the internet, and its relationship with the OpenID4VP profiles used in the EUDI ecosystem.
Overview
ISO/IEC 18013-7 extends the proximity-based protocols of ISO/IEC 18013-5 to remote presentation over the internet. It defines three annexes, each with a different transport and invocation mechanism.
| Annex | Name | Transport | Wallet adoption |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | REST API (device retrieval) | HTTP POST with raw CBOR | None of the major wallets |
| B | OpenID4VP (online presentation) | openid4vp:// URIs, direct_post | All major EUDI wallets |
| C | W3C Digital Credentials API | navigator.credentials.get() | All major EUDI wallets |
Note
In the France Identité ecosystem and other national mDL deployments, “ISO 18013-7 (Annex B)” is used as an umbrella term for the entire online mDoc presentation flow. Annex C defines the
["dcapi", ...]CBOR wrapper that carries the DeviceRequest and DeviceResponse inside the browser API. It is the encoding layer, not a standalone profile.
Annex A: REST API (device retrieval)
Pure HTTP-based remote device retrieval. The verifier sends a CBOR-encoded DeviceRequest with an HTTP POST to a wallet endpoint or a proxy server, and receives a CBOR DeviceResponse in the HTTP response.
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Invocation | HTTP POST directly to a wallet endpoint or a proxy |
| Request | CBOR DeviceRequest (ISO 18013-5) |
| Response | CBOR DeviceResponse |
| Encryption | Network-layer session encryption (no standardised protocol) |
| Trust | No global trust list; the verifier authenticates over TLS |
| Developer effort | CBOR parsing, COSE cryptography, and session key establishment at the network layer |
| Wallet support | None. France Identité, EUDI Wallet DE, IT Wallet, and Spanish EUDIW do not implement Annex A |
Implementation status in ewQwe: not implemented. No wallet supports Annex A.
Annex B: OpenID4VP (online presentation)
Annex B standardises mDoc presentation over the OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect framework. The verifier acts as an OAuth 2.0 client and builds an authorization request URI that the wallet processes.
Flow
%%{init: {'theme': 'base', 'themeVariables': { 'background': '#ffffff', 'mainBkg': '#ffffff', 'clusterBkg': '#ffffff', 'clusterBorder': '#cbd5e1', 'lineColor': '#334155', 'primaryColor': '#ffffff', 'secondaryColor': '#ffffff', 'tertiaryColor': '#ffffff', 'primaryTextColor': '#0f172a', 'secondaryTextColor': '#0f172a', 'tertiaryTextColor': '#0f172a', 'edgeLabelBackground': '#ffffff' }}}%%
sequenceDiagram
participant RP as Relying Party
participant Wallet as Wallet
RP->>Wallet: openid4vp:// URI, by QR code or link
Note over Wallet: The user selects the credential and consents to release it
Wallet-->>RP: POST direct_post with the VP Token, optionally encrypted
Note over RP: Validate the signatures and the nonce
Note over RP: Read the disclosed claims
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Invocation | Universal or deep links (openid4vp://), request_uri fetch, or an HTTP direct_post |
| Request | DCQL query (JSON); the legacy Presentation Exchange format is supported as a fallback |
| Response | A vp_token that carries an mDoc or an SD-JWT, optionally JWE-encrypted (direct_post.jwt) |
| Request signing | JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request, RFC 9101) |
| Trust model | The verifier identity is proven by an X.509 certificate or by redirect URI matching |
| Developer effort | JWT and JWE handling, DCQL evaluation, and OpenID4VP state management |
| Wallet support | All major EUDI wallets |
Profiles that use Annex B
Two profiles use the Annex B transport. See Protocol modes for the comparison.
Annex C: W3C Digital Credentials API (DC API)
Annex C moves the request mechanism into the client-side browser with navigator.credentials.get(). The browser and the operating system handle wallet invocation.
Flow
%%{init: {'theme': 'base', 'themeVariables': { 'background': '#ffffff', 'mainBkg': '#ffffff', 'clusterBkg': '#ffffff', 'clusterBorder': '#cbd5e1', 'lineColor': '#334155', 'primaryColor': '#ffffff', 'secondaryColor': '#ffffff', 'tertiaryColor': '#ffffff', 'primaryTextColor': '#0f172a', 'secondaryTextColor': '#0f172a', 'tertiaryTextColor': '#0f172a', 'edgeLabelBackground': '#ffffff' }}}%%
sequenceDiagram
participant RP as Relying Party browser
participant Wallet as Wallet at the operating system level
RP->>Wallet: navigator.credentials.get with a digital credential request
Note over Wallet: The user selects the credential and consents to release it
Wallet-->>RP: Resolve with the HPKE-encrypted DeviceResponse
Note over RP: Decrypt the response and verify the signatures
Note over RP: Read the disclosed claims
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Invocation | Browser API: navigator.credentials.get({ digital: ... }) |
| Request payload | ["dcapi", { nonce, recipientPublicKey }] plus a CBOR DeviceRequest |
| Response payload | An HPKE-encrypted mDoc inside ["dcapi", { enc, cipherText }] |
| Encryption | HPKE (X25519, HKDF-SHA256, AES-128-GCM) |
| Transport | The browser and the operating system handle wallet invocation, including cross-device relay |
| Trust model | Trust is based on web origins and platform-verified app links |
| Developer effort | Low. The browser handles wallet discovery and session binding |
| Wallet support | All major EUDI wallets, which wrap the OpenID4VP request as dc_api.jwt |
Annex C request format
The request is two base64url-encoded CBOR blobs.
encryptionInfo tells the wallet how to encrypt the response:
["dcapi", { nonce: bstr, recipientPublicKey: COSE_Key }]
deviceRequest states what to present, per ISO 18013-5:
{
"version": "1.0",
"docRequests": [{
"docType": "eu.europa.ec.av.1",
"itemsRequest": {
"nameSpaces": {
"eu.europa.ec.av.1": { "age_over_18": true }
}
}
}]
}
Annex C response format
The wallet returns an HPKE-encrypted response:
["dcapi", { "enc": "<base64url>", "cipherText": "<base64url>" }]
The relying party decrypts the response with its private key and obtains the CBOR DeviceResponse.
OpenID4VP profiles
Two profiles use the Annex B transport.
- EU Age Verification (EU-AV) blueprint — privacy-preserving age checks driven by the Digital Services Act. It uses Annex B as a fallback with the
redirect_urischeme, no JAR, and a plaindirect_post. The primary method is Annex C (DC API). - High Assurance Interoperability Profile (HAIP) — high-security credential exchange for a PID and an mDL. It requires strict JAR signing with X.509 certificates (
x509_san_dnsorx509_hash) and JWE-encrypted responses (direct_post.jwt).
References
- ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 — mDL data model
- ISO/IEC 18013-7:2025 — mDoc online presentation
- OpenID4VP 1.0
- Full reference list